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Abstract
This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing inno-
vation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new
mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licens-
ing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract.
The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary licens-
ing without reducing bidders’ surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than
both standard license auctions and pure royalty licensing. We also take into
account that the number of licenses must be an integer, which is typically
ignored in the literature.
JEL classifications: D21, D43, D44, D45.
Keywords: Patents, Licensing, Auctions, Royalty, Innovation, R&D, Mecha-
nism Design.
1. introduction
This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing an outside innovator’s
cost reducing innovation to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a simple new
mechanism that combines elements of a fixed–fee license auction with roy-
alty licensing in a particular way. This new mechanism is more profitable
than the standard solutions evaluated in the literature such as fixed–fee
license auctions, fixed–fee licensing, royalty licensing, and fixed–fee com-
bined with royalty licensing (see Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986, Katz and
Shapiro, 1985, 1986).
The key feature of the proposed mechanism is that it grants the losers of the
license auction the option to sign a royalty contract. Like in the standard
auction, the innovator auctions a restricted number of fixed–fee licenses;
but, after the auction, he also grants the losers of the auction the right to
sign a royalty license contract.
In equilibrium, the innovator sets the royalty rate equal to the marginal cost
reduction induced by using the innovation. As a result, the royalty licensing
granted in the second stage, after the auction, has no effect on equilibrium
bids since losers of the auction have the same payoff functions as if no
royalty option had been granted. Furthermore, in equilibrium the number
of auctioned licenses is such that no loser is crowded out of the market.
Thus, royalty income is collected and superiority is achieved.
Our analysis also takes into account that the number of licenses must be
an integer. Recently, Sen (2005) showed that this integer constraint can
make royalty contracts superior to the standard license auction, contrary
to the ranking alleged in the literature. However, as we show, accounting
for that integer constraint does not affect the superiority of the proposed
new mechanism relative to both the standard license auction and royalty
licensing.
The literature on patent licensing in oligopoly has branched out in various
directions. Sen and Tauman (2005) combined a license auction with roy-
alty licensing in the form of two-part tariffs, under complete information.
Wang (1998) and Kamien and Tauman (2002) analyzed the licensing prob-
lem from the perspective of an innovator who is also an incumbent player in
the downstream product market. While an outside innovator is only inter-
ested in licensing income, an “inside” innovator must also take into account
how giving access to his innovation affects his downstream profit. Muto
(1993), Hernández-Murillo and Llobet (2006) dealt with other market orga-
nizations such as Bertrand competition with product differentiation in lieu
of the Cournot competition assumed here. And Beggs (1992), Gallini and
Wright (1990), Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1991) examined the bene-
fits of royalty licensing either as a screening device in the face of incomplete
information concerning the users’ willingness to pay for the innovation or
as a signaling device if the innovator has superior information concerning
the cost reductions induced by his innovation.
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The licensing policy proposed in the present paper is obviously discrimina-
tory because different buyers pay different prices for the use of the same
innovation. This raises the question: is that kind of discrimination employed
in industry and is it compatible with antitrust law? Unfortunately, the em-
pirical literature on licensing practices does not provide sufficient evidence
to fully address this issue. A widely cited study of 37 U.S. firms observes
that “A down payment with running royalties method was used 46% of the
time, while straight royalties and paid-up licenses accounted for 39% and
13%, respectively. Other forms of compensation such as periodic lump sum
payments, cross licensing, stock equities and royalty free licenses, although
mentioned, were used an insignificant portion of the time (2%)” (Rostoker,
1984, p.64). This finding is often interpreted as proving the predominance
of royalty licensing. However, that study also reports that the same inno-
vator often employs different licensing schemes, possibly for licensing the
same innovation to different customers.
Moreover, casual evidence suggests this kind of discrimination is widely
used in software licensing and in the sale of innovative products. A case
in point is the “Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Licensing” where
PC manufacturers are sometimes given a choice between a “one-time paid-
up” license, which entitles the manufacturer to unlimited distribution of the
software within a specified time period, and a per copy royalty license.
Similarly, new products are often sold to some users for unrestricted use
while others are offered a leasing contract which is effectively a royalty li-
censing scheme. The only difference between these arrangements and the
one proposed here is that customers are typically given a free choice be-
tween these two arrangements, whereas the proposed policy assumes that
the innovator limits that choice by offering a restricted number of one-time
paid-up licenses.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2. we state the licensing prob-
lem as a sequential game and introduce basic assumptions. Section 3. sum-
marizes some general properties of the equilibrium, and Section 4. examines
the superiority of the proposed mechanism in a fairly general framework.
In Section 5. we specialize and consider the linear model that is assumed
in a large part of the literature. This allows us to give an explicit solution
of the optimal mechanism and to strengthen our results. Finally, Section 6.
outlines some directions for further research.
2. the model
There are n ≥ 2 firms with the linear cost function Ci(qi) := cqi, c > 0, and
the inverse demand function P(Q) with Q :=
∑n
i=1 qi. They play a Cournot
game.
An outside innovator owns a patented innovation that reduces the marginal
cost from c to c − ǫ with c > ǫ > 0. The innovator can permit the use of
that innovation by auctioning fixed–fee licenses or by offering royalty license
contracts.
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Throughout this text we employ the usual notion of a drastic vs. non–drastic
innovation. An innovation is drastic if its exclusive use by one firm propels
monopolization. Every innovation induces a natural oligopoly of a certain
size, denoted by K, in the sense that if K or more firms operate with the new
technology (at marginal cost c − ǫ), all firms with marginal cost c exit, i.e.
their equilibrium output is equal to zero. In this text we assume that the
innovation is non–drastic in the sense that K > 1.1
The following stage game is played: the innovator chooses a licensing mech-
anism; then firms play that mechanism as a noncooperative game; finally,
firms play a Cournot market game under complete information, after having
observed the outcome of the previous play, knowing who gained access to
the innovation and how.
We introduce the modified license auction G := (k, r), which is a general
class of mechanisms that includes both the fixed-fee license auction, GA,
and (linear) royalty licensing, GR, as special cases. In these mechanisms the
innovator sells k fixed-fee licenses in a first-price auction, possibly with a
minimum bid (which is needed if k = n) and gives those firms who do not
acquire a license the option to sign a linear royalty contract with the royalty
rate per output unit r > 0. The number of licenses k must be an integer
(which makes a difference but is typically ignored in the literature).
Evidently, if r > ǫ, no firm will exercise the royalty option. Therefore, if
r > ǫ, the mechanism G is equivalent to the standard license auction GA
analyzed by Kamien (1992) and others. And if k = 0 it is equivalent to the
standard royalty licensing GR.
Throughout our analysis, the inverse market demand function P satisfies
the following assumptions:2
Assumption 1 The market demand function Q(p) is strictly decreasing and
continuously differentiable for p > 0, and its price elasticity, η(p), is non-
decreasing in p. Moreover, P(Q)Q is strictly concave in Q and P(0) > c, and
P(Q) = 0 for all Q ≥ Q¯ > 0 (satiation point).
In the following we refer to a fixed–fee license as a “license” and to those
firms who obtain a license as “licensees”. Depending upon the context, a
non–licensee may either have a royalty contract or no access to the innova-
tion.
3. basic properties of the game
The equilibrium concept is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibriumwhich
is found by backward induction.
1The notation is borrowed from Kamien (1992). The case of drastic innovation, K ≤ 1,
is trivial. There, the innovation induces a natural monopoly where issuing one fixed–fee
license is optimal.
2These assumptions are similar to those employed in Kamien, Oren, and Tauman (1992).
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Cournot subgames The Cournot subgame is played between licensees
(L) and non–licensees (N). All non–licensees have been offered a royalty
contract. We look at the particular subgames where all k fixed–fee licenses
have been bought and all n − k non–licensees have accepted the royalty
contract if r ≤ ǫ and no royalty contract has been signed if r > ǫ. Signing a
royalty contract changes a non–licensee’s unit cost from c to c − ǫ+ r .
Depending upon howmany fixed–fee licenses have been sold, in equilibrium
either all non–licensees are crowded out or coexist and produce positive
outputs. The critical level of k above which all non–licensees are crowded
out depends upon their effective unit cost, c − ǫ+ r . We denote it byK(r),
and mention that for r = ǫ issuing K(ǫ) = K licenses establishes a natural
oligopoly of size K.
Using the measure K(r) it follows that all firms, licensees L and non–
licensees N alike, will coexist in the Cournot market for all k ∈ ILN whereas
only licensees play that game for all k ∈ IL, where
ILN := {k | 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and k <K(r)} , (1)
IL := {k | k ≥K(r) or k = n} . (2)
We denote the equilibrium Cournot quantities and profits of licensees (L)
and non–licensees (N) by qL(k, r), qN(k, r),πL(k, r),πN(k, r). Note that for
r ≥ ǫ all non–licensees have an effective unit cost equal to c (since a contract
with r > ǫ is never accepted), as in the standard license auction game GA,
without royalty contract option, studied by Kamien (1992), Kamien, Oren,
and Tauman (1992) and others.
Licensing subgames Now consider the licensing subgames. The “value
of a license”, v(k, r), is the difference between the operating profits of a
licensee and a non–licensee. Thereby, one must distinguish between k < n
and k = n. If k < n a bidder cannot unilaterally influence how many firms
will be licensed; whereas if k = n, a firm can reduce the number of licenses
by not bidding. Therefore,
v(k, r) =

πL(k, r)−πN(k, r) if k ≤ n− 1πL(n, r)−πN(n− 1, r ) if k = n. (3)
Suppose k = n. If a bidder unilaterally abstains from bidding, he thus
reduces the number of licensees to n − 1. This either crowds him out
(πN(n − 1, r ) = 0), which occurs if n − 1 ≥ K(r), or allows him to earn
a positive profit as a royalty contractor (πN(n− 1, r ) > 0), if n− 1 <K(r).
Therefore, in the following we partition the set IL into
IL− :={k | (k ≤ n− 1, k ≥K(r)) or (k = n,n− 1 ≥ K(r))} (4)
IL+ :={k | k = n,n− 1 <K(r)} . (5)
Obviously, if k = n, the auction can only generate revenue if the innovator
has set an appropriate minimum bid, because otherwise firms can buy a
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license with a zero bid. Whereas, if k < n, a minimum bid serves no purpose.
Therefore, we assume that the innovator has set a minimum bid equal to
v(n, r) if k = n (as in Kamien (1992)).
We stress that in the modified license auction G the bid functions are the
same as in the standard license auctionGA if r ≥ ǫ. This follows immediately
from the fact that for r > ǫ the twomechanisms are equivalent, and for r = ǫ
the Cournot subgames are the same, because non–licensees’ effective unit
cost is equal to c in both environments, and therefore the value of a license
is the same in both G and GA.
We also mention that for the same number of licenses k and the royalty rate
r = ǫ the innovator earns the same fixed–fee license income in both G and
GA. However, the innovator may earn royalty income in G but not in GA.
Therefore, under these conditions G is Pareto superior to GA.
4. superiority of the modified license auction
The optimal modified license auction G∗ := (k∗, r∗) is defined as the maxi-
mizer of the innovator’s payoff
Π(k, r) := kv(k, r)+ (n− k)rqN(k, r), (6)
and G∗R , G
∗
A are similarly defined as maximizers subject to the constraint
k = 0, resp. r > ǫ.
Since the standard fixed–fee license auction and royalty licensing are special
cases of G = (k, r) one can immediately rank G relative to GA and GR, as
follows:
Proposition 1 The optimal modified license auction is weakly more prof-
itable than both optimal royalty licensing and the optimal license auction:3
Π
∗ ≥max
{
Π
A∗ ,ΠR
∗
}
.
The remaining task is to examine whether the ranking of the innovator’s
profit can be strengthened especially if one accounts for the fact that the
number of licenses is an integer.
A key result of the literature is that for an outside innovator the optimal
license auction, G∗A, is more profitable than royalty licensing, GR. Recently,
Sen (2005) qualified this result by showing that GR can be more profitable
than G∗A if one takes into account that k is integer constrained. However, as
we now show:
Proposition 2 The optimal modified license auction is strictly more prof-
itable than optimal royalty licensing: Π∗ > ΠR
∗
.
3Note: Fixed-fee licensing is a special case of a license auction (obtained by setting
k = n). Therefore, the stated mechanisms also dominate fixed–fee licensing.
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Proof Consider royalty licensing at the rate r ∈ (0, ǫ] (royalty rates greater
than ǫ are never accepted). We prove the assertion by showing that the
particular modified license auction (1, r ) that issues one license and offers
the royalty rate r is more profitable for the innovator.
Denote firms’ equilibrium outputs under royalty licensing and the modified
license auction by qR resp. (qL, qN), the associated aggregate outputs by
QR := nqR, QM := qL + (n − 1)qN , and the equilibrium prices by pR, pM .
Then, the innovator’s profit is
Π(1, r ) =
(
pM − c + ǫ
)
qL −
(
pM − c + ǫ− r
)
qN + r(n− 1)qN
=
(
pM − c + ǫ− r
) (
qL − qN
)
+ rQM
>rQM > rQR = Π(0, r ).
The first inequality follows from three facts: 1) the innovation is non–drastic
and therefore the one licensee cannot crowd out other firms which assures
that the Cournot equilibrium price pM remains above the marginal cost c,
pM > c; hence, royalty income is generated; 2) ǫ ≥ r ; 3) qL > qN because the
licensee has lower marginal cost. To understand the second inequality, note
that both regimes induce an n-firms oligopoly, where one firm has lower
marginal cost in the modified license auction, which gives rise to a higher
aggregate output, as we show in detail in the Appendix. 
While the above result is unaffected by the integer constraint concerning k,
the latter may upset the strict superiority of G∗ relative to G∗A.
Proposition 3 The optimal modified license auction, G∗, is strictly more
profitable than G∗A := (k
∗
A, r
∗
A ), with r
∗
A > ǫ, if 1) k is not integer constrained
and if 2) k is integer constrained and k∗A < K.
Proof 1) Consider the mechanism (k∗A, ǫ) for which obviously Π(k
∗
A, ǫ) ≥
Π
A∗ , because switching from (k, r) with r > ǫ (which is the mechanism GA)
to (k, ǫ) does not affect the license income, k(πL−πN). We show that it can
be improved by reducing k below k∗A, so that Π
∗ > ΠA
∗
.
Compute the left partial derivative of the innovator’s profit with respect to
k, evaluated at k = k∗A, and one finds for r = ǫ
∂Π
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗A
=
∂
∂k
(k(πL −πN))
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗A
+
∂
∂k
(
ǫ(n− k)qN
)∣∣∣∣
k=k∗A
=
∂ΠA
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣
k=k∗A
+
∂
∂k
(
ǫ(n− k)qN
)∣∣∣∣
k=k∗A
< 0.
By definition of k∗A, the first part of the RHS of the last equation is equal to
zero, and the second part is negative since (n−k)qN is obviously decreasing
in k. This proves the inequality, and it follows immediately that Π∗ > ΠA
∗
.
2) Now we assess what is changed due to the integer constraint. Note that
generically K is not an integer. Therefore, one has either k∗A < K or k
∗
A > K.
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If k∗A < K the mechanism (k
∗
A, ǫ) generates the same license income as G
∗
A
yet adds positive royalty income; therefore, Π∗ > ΠA
∗
.
If k∗A > K, the innovator’s profit can only be higher under G if k < k
∗
A,
because otherwise there is no royalty income. However, one cannot reduce
by less than 1 unit, which may be too much to be profitable. 
In the following we specialize and assume the linear model that is typically
employed in the license auction literature (see Kamien, 1992, Kamien and
Tauman, 1984, 1986). In that framework the optimal modified license auc-
tion can be solved explicitly, and Proposition 3 can be strengthened to the
strict superiority of G∗.
5. the modified license auction in the standard linear model
The literature on patent licensing typically assumes linear market demand
P(Q) := a−Q with a > c > 0 . We now solve G∗ for that linear model and
show that Proposition 3 can be strengthened.
Cournot subgame For r ≤ ǫ the equilibrium outputs, size of the natural
oligopolyK(r), and operating profits, πL, πN , are
qL(k, r) =


(K+1)ǫ+r(n−k)
n+1 if k ∈ ILN
(K+1)ǫ
k+1 if k ∈ IL
(7)
qN(k, r) =


(K+1)ǫ−r(k+1)
n+1 if k ∈ ILN or k = 0
0 if k ∈ IL
(8)
K(r) =
(K + 1)ǫ− r
r
, K :=
a− c
ǫ
=K(ǫ) (9)
πi(k, r) =qi(k, r)
2, i ∈ {L,N}. (10)
And for r > ǫ one has qi(k, r) = qi(k, ǫ), i ∈ {L,N},K(r) = K. (Of course,
if k = 0, all firms are non–licensees.)
We do not explicitly solve the other subgames in which either not all licenses
were sold or some losers failed to sign a royalty contract. Evidently, being a
licensee ismore profitable than being a non–licensee for all k. Similarly, non–
licensees are never worse–off if they sign the royalty contract. Therefore,
these subgames are not encountered by rational players.4
4The case r = ǫ is special. There, the licensing subgame has several equilibria, one where
all non–licensees sign the royalty contract and others were some do not sign. However,
only the equilibrium where all non–licensees sign are part of the overall equilibrium of the
game that includes the innovator’s choice of mechanism.
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Licensing subgame The unique equilibrium strategy is to bid the value of
a license: b(k, r) = v(k, r). If k < n, then πN(k, r) is equal to zero for k ≥
K(r) and positive for k <K(r). If k = n,πN(k−1, r ) is equal to zero forn−
1 ≥ K(r) and positive otherwise. Using these facts, one can easily compute
v(k, r) and hence the asserted equilibrium strategy, using the equilibrium
profits of the Cournot subgame (10) together with the value of the innovation
defined in (3). Therefore, for r ≤ ǫ one obtains the following equilibrium
bid function
b(k, r) =


r2(n−2k−1)+2rǫ(K+1)
n+1 if k ∈ ILN(
(K+1)ǫ
k+1
)2
if k ∈ IL−
nr(2ǫ(K+1)−nr)
(n+1)2
if k ∈ IL+ .
(11)
For r > ǫ one has b(k, r) = b(k, ǫ).
The optimal mechanism
Proposition 4 In the linear model G∗ = (k∗, r∗) is unique, at least one
and at most n− 1 firms are awarded a fixed–fee license, all others a royalty
contract, and no firm is crowded out. Specifically, r∗ = ǫ and
k∗ =

Round
(
K+1
2
)
1 < K < 2n− 3
n− 1 K > 2n− 3,
(12)
where “Round” means rounding to the nearest integer.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Since G∗ always generates positive royalty income (which is absent in G∗A),
G∗ is unique, and GA is a special case of G, we conclude immediately:
Corollary 1 In the linear model, the optimal modified license auction is
strictly more profitable than the optimal license auction, Π∗ > ΠA
∗
.
6. discussion
We close with a sketch of some interesting extensions for further research.
The purpose of these extensions is to assess whether the proposed mecha-
nism can be expected to perform well in a variety of circumstances.
The literature has suggested that the use of pure royalty licensing can be
justified by uncertainty concerning the success of the innovation. This is
due to the fact that royalty licensing entails a sharing of that risk between
innovator and licensees. In this regard, the proposed mechanism could per-
form even better than pure royalty licensing. If firms have different degrees
of risk aversion, the more risk averse firms would tend to lose the auction
and then exercise the royalty licensing option. And the less risk averse firms
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would tend to win one of the fixed–fee licenses in the auction. In this way,
the proposed mechanism would allow the innovator to gain from price dis-
crimination between firms with different degrees of risk aversion.
In a recent paper, Sen and Tauman (2005) combined a license auction with
royalty licensing by assuming that the innovator employs a two-part tariff,
under complete information. It seems that adding royalty licensing to the
losers of the auction is even better. This suggests that one should combine
the auctioning of a limited number of royalty licenses, with a given royalty
rate, with the pure royalty licensing option proposed in the present paper.
Aoki and Tauman (2001) have explored how spillovers affect the optimal
license auction. Spillovers reduce the royalty dividends collected by the
innovator, since part of the cost reduction due to the innovation is already
available without licensing. This suggests that spillovers make the option
to sign a royalty licensing contract less valuable. But it should not eliminate
that benefit altogether, unless the complete cost reduction spills over.
Finally, it should be interesting to evaluate our proposal in the context of
other market rules, such as under price competition in differentiated goods
markets.
7. appendix
7.1. Supplement to the Proof of Proposition 2
We compare royalty licensing with the royalty rate r with the particular modified
license auction (1, r ) and prove that QM > QR.
Under royalty licensing the aggregate equilibrium output QR solves the condition
pR
(
n− pR/ηR
)
= n(c − ǫ+ r). (13)
Similarly, under the modified license auction (1, r ), one has
pM
(
n− pM/ηM
)
= n(c − ǫ+ r)− r . (14)
By assumption, η is non-decreasing inp. Since the right-hand-side of (13) is greater
than that of (14) it follows that pR > pM and therefore QM > QR.
7.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof In the proof of Proposition 2 we have already shown that k∗ ≥ 1. There-
fore, in the following we ignore the case k = 0.
1) We show that r∗ = ǫ is optimal for each k. The choice of k is restricted to
integers. Consider k ∈ ILN. There, the innovator’s profit, ΠLN(k, r) := Π(k, r) for
k ∈ ILN, is equal to
ΠLN(k, r) =
rǫ(K + 1)(k+n)− r 2(k2 +n)
n+ 1
. (15)
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Using the fact that k <K(r), which is equivalent to ǫ(K + 1) > r(k+ 1), one has
∂
∂r
ΠLN(k, r) =
ǫ(K + 1)(k+n)− 2r(k2 +n)
n+ 1
>
r(n− k)(k− 1)
n+ 1
≥ 0.
(16)
Therefore, for k ∈ ILN it is optimal to set the highest possible royalty rate, r = ǫ.
If k ∈ IL− , one has qN(k, r) = 0. Therefore, the innovator’s profit is equal to
b(k, r)k, which in turn is independent of r (see (11)). Therefore, all royalty rates,
including r = ǫ, are equally profitable.
Similarly, for the parameter set IL+ , where qN(n, r) = 0, one obtains (using the
fact that n− 1 <K(r) is equivalent to (K + 1)ǫ−nr > 0)
∂
∂r
ΠL+(n, r) =
2n2((K + 1)ǫ−nr)
(n+ 1)2
> 0. (17)
This completes the proof that r = ǫ is optimal, regardless of k.
Since r∗ = ǫ, the equilibrium bid function simplifies to:
b(k) =


(2(K−k)+n+1)ǫ2
n+1 if k ∈ ILN(
(K+1)ǫ
k+1
)2
if k ∈ IL−
(2K+2−n)ǫ2n
(n+1)2
if k ∈ IL+
(18)
2) We now compute k∗, given that r∗ = ǫ. Note that K(ǫ) = K. We proceed
as follows: First, we compute the profit maximizing k that would be obtained if
k were restricted to the subsets ILN, IL− , and IL+ , respectively. These restricted
maximizers are denoted by k∗LN, k
∗
L− , k
∗
L+ . Then, we examine which of these is
the global maximizer, depending upon the parameter K, taking into account the
integer constraint concerning k. Thereby we use the fact that K is generically not
an integer.
2a) The innovator’s equilibrium profit over the subset ILN is
ΠLN(k, ǫ) =
(−k2 + k(K + 1)+Kn)ǫ2
n+ 1
. (19)
We compute the profit maximizing k over this subset ILN, at first ignoring the
integer constraint concerning k. Note that this profit function is quadratic in k
and strictly concave.
Themaximizer is the interior solution kLN =
K+1
2
if
K+1
2
∈ ILN, i.e. if 1 ≤
K+1
2
≤ n−1
and
K+1
2 < K. Since K > 1 (by assumption) and since K is not an integer, these
conditions are equivalent to K < 2n − 3. In turn, if K > 2n − 3 one obtains the
corner solution kLN = n− 1. Therefore, ignoring the integer constraint one has
k∗LN =
{
K+1
2 if K < 2n− 3
n− 1 if K > 2n− 3.
(20)
Now we take into account that k must be an integer. If K > 2n − 3, one has
kLN = n − 1 which is an integer. Whereas if K < 2n − 3, kLN =
K+1
2 is never an
integer. Recall that the equilibrium profit is quadratic and therefore symmetric
around
K+1
2
. Therefore, the true maximizer is the nearest integer within ILN. We
now show that it can be found by simply rounding to the nearest integer since that
number is always in ILN.
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Since
K+1
2
∈ [1, n − 1], and 1 and n − 1 are integers, Round
(
K+1
2
)
∈ [1, n −
1]. Therefore, in order to show that Round
(
K+1
2
)
∈ ILN we only need to show
that Round
(
K+1
2
)
< K. Evidently, that condition is potentially violated only if
one rounds up. Assume the nearest integer is found by rounding up. Then,
Round
(
K+1
2
)
≤
K+1
2
+
1
2
=
K+2
2
. Since
K+2
2
< K holds if and only if K > 2 we
only need to worry about the case K < 2. However, if K < 2, one has
K+1
2 < 1.5,
and thus one does not round up.
We conclude that
k∗LN =

Round
(
K+1
2
)
if K < 2n− 3
n− 1 if K > 2n− 3.
(21)
2b) The innovator’s equilibrium profit over the subset IL− is
ΠL−(k, ǫ) =
(K + 1)2kǫ2
(k+ 1)2
. (22)
We assess the profit maximizing k over this subset IL− , denoted by k
∗
L− .
First, notice that this profit function is strict monotone decreasing in k for k ≥ 1.
Therefore, the maximizer is smallest integer in IL− . That set is empty iff K > n−1.
And if K < n − 1 the smallest integer in IL− is the smallest integer that satisfies
the condition k > K. Obviously, the maximum profit over IL− is smaller than the
profit obtained from inserting k = K into ΠL−(k, ǫ).
2c) Finally, notice that IL+ = ∅ iff K < n − 1. And if K > n − 1 one has IL+ = n;
therefore, in that case k∗L+ = n.
We summarize the results 2a)-2c) in the following Table:
1 < K < n− 1 n− 1 < K < 2n− 3 K > 2n− 3
k∗LN Round
(
K+1
2
)
Round
(
K+1
2
)
n− 1
k∗L− K − −
k∗L+ − n n
3) Finally, we find the global maximum for all values of K.
3a) If 1 < K < n− 1 one finds:
ΠLN(k
∗
LN, ǫ)−ΠL−(k
∗
L− , ǫ) >ΠLN(k, ǫ)−ΠL−(K, ǫ)
=
(−k2 + k(K + 1)+Kn)ǫ2
n+ 1
−
(K + 1)2Kǫ2
(K + 1)2
=
(K − k)(k− 1)ǫ2
n+ 1
≥ 0
Therefore, k∗ = k∗LN.
3b) If n− 1 < K < 2n− 3 one obtains (notice that k = n− 1 ∈ ILN in that case):
ΠLN(k
∗
LN, ǫ)−ΠL+(n, ǫ) ≥ΠLN(n− 1, ǫ)−ΠL+(n, ǫ)
=
((n− 1)(K + 1)+Kn− (n− 1)2)ǫ2
n+ 1
−
n2(2+ 2K −n)ǫ2
(n+ 1)2
=
(n− 2+K(n− 1))ǫ2
(n+ 1)2
> 0.
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Therefore, k∗ = k∗LN in that case.
3c) If K > 2n−3 one obtains k∗ = k∗LN from the fact thatΠLN(n−1, ǫ)−ΠL+(n, ǫ) >
0 which has already been established in 3b).
We conclude that for all parameters K one has k∗ = k∗LN. Therefore, by the defini-
tion ILN both licensees and non-licensees coexist and produce positive equilibrium
outputs, and hence royalty income is always generated. 
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